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KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP			SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY	
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte BRADLEY J. SWEARINGEN,
DAVID S. HARDING,
BRANT C. LEWIS,
RICHARD MUÑOZ JR.,
GREGORY SCOTT MOGONYE,
GREGORY FERRIS, and
PHILIP R. BERBER

Appeal 2009-009099
Application 09/663,151
Technology Center 3600

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and
BIBHU R. MOHANTY, *Administrative Patent Judges*.
FETTING, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL¹

¹ The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE” (paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.

1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE²

2 Bradley J. Swearingen, David S. Harding, Brant C. Lewis, Richard
3 Munoz Jr., Gregory Scott Mogonye, Gregory Ferris, and Philip R. Berber
4 (Appellants) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2002) of a final rejection of
5 claims 67-114, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We
6 have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).

7 The Appellants invented a way of executing financial security trades
8 (Specification 1).

9 An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
10 exemplary claim 67, which is reproduced below [bracketed matter and some
11 paragraphing added].

12 67. A computer readable medium having a sequence of
13 instructions which, when executed by a processing entity,
14 effectuates a trade in a user selected user preferred security, the
15 computer readable medium comprising:
16 a code segment for identifying user preferred securities from a
17 plurality of securities based upon at least two user specific
18 criteria including at least one criterion related to pricing;
19 a code segment for generating a graph in which each of the user
20 preferred securities is represented and graphically differentiated

² Our decision will make reference to the Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed August 14, 2008) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed December 22, 2008), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed October 28, 2008).

1 from each of the other user preferred securities based upon the
2 values of at least three user specific parameters associated with
3 each of the user preferred securities;
4 a code segment for receiving a user selection of one of the user
5 preferred securities represented on the graph;
6 a code segment for associating order parameters with the user
7 selected user preferred security; and
8 a code segment for sending an order to execute a trade in the
9 user selected user preferred security according to the order
10 parameters.

11 Claims 67-114 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
12 statutory subject matter.

13 **ISSUE**

14 The issue of whether the rejected claims recite statutory subject matter
15 turns on whether a claim to software on a computer readable medium may
16 be statutory if the software is more than an abstract idea when operating on a
17 computer.

18 **ANALYSIS**

19 There are 6 independent claims. Claims 67 and 82 are drawn toward a
20 computer readable medium having a sequence of instructions which, when
21 executed by a processing entity, effectuates a trade. Claims 83 and 98 are
22 drawn towards systems and claims 99 and 114 are drawn towards methods.
23 Thus only claims 67-82 are drawn towards computer readable media.

24 The Examiner found that all of the claims were drawn toward computer
25 readable media. Ans. 3. This in itself is factually incorrect, as claims 83-
26 114 are drawn towards systems and methods.

1 As to claims 67-82, and also claims 83-98, we are persuaded of error in
2 the Examiner’s rejection for the reasons set forth by the Appellants at
3 Appeal Br. 11-31 and Reply Br. 2-10.

4 The Examiner’s rejection is premised under two alternate theories. First,
5 that the claims are not concrete because they depend on the results of human
6 input and different inputs would produce different results. As this is true of
7 any device accepting human input, clearly this is not a relevant inquiry. The
8 Examiner made no finding that for a given input; the result would not be
9 determinative, which is the pertinent inquiry.

10 The second theory is inoperability. Here the Examiner contradicts the
11 earlier finding that all claims were drawn toward media and separates this
12 theory into that for media, systems and method claims. The Examiner
13 premises inoperability for media claims on the finding that the media do not
14 produce any function until resident in a computer. This finding is in conflict
15 with *In re Lowry*, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994) in which
16 functional data structures must be afforded patentable weight. A computer
17 program is a data structure and imparts function within a computer.
18 Whether the medium is actually within the computer is irrelevant so long as
19 the data structure is such that it functionally affects computer operation
20 when it is in the computer.

21 As to the system claims, the Examiner construed the phrase “means for”
22 as meaning the function was to be broadly construed rather than construed
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Ans. 6. This is in conflict with *In re*
24 *Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (*en banc*), in which means
25 plus function claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 were held to be required

1 to be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. As these claims
2 were improperly construed, the Examiner failed to present a *prima facie* case
3 for at least that reason. The Examiner made further findings in the Response
4 at Ans. 11 that the means were structurally limited in the claims. The
5 Examiner found that for example the means for generating a graph “is
6 modified by a lot of structure.” *Id.* The Examiner points to no such
7 structure specifically, but appears to make an unsubstantiated finding of
8 structure. Indeed, it is the function that is further elaborated upon rather than
9 the means in the claim limitations the Examiner alludes to. For example, the
10 graph limitation the Examiner refers to recites how the graph is to appear,
11 which is an elaboration of the generating function, rather than providing any
12 structure for actually performing the generation. As such, we again find the
13 Examiner has improperly construed the apparatus claims.

14 As to the method claims, the Examiner found the claims recited non-
15 statutory processes. Ans. 8. Claim 98 is exemplary.

16 98. A method for enabling a trade in a user selected user
17 preferred security, the method comprising:
18 identifying user preferred securities from a plurality of
19 securities based upon at least two user specific criteria
20 including at least one criterion related to pricing;
21 generating a graph in which each of the user preferred securities
22 is represented and graphically differentiated from each of the
23 other user preferred securities based upon the values of at least
24 three user specific parameters associated with each of the user
25 preferred securities;
26 receiving a user selection of one of the user preferred securities
27 represented on the graph;
28 associating order parameters with the user selected user
29 preferred security; and

1 sending an order to execute a trade in the user selected user
2 preferred security according to the order parameters.

3 The Appellants respond that the limitations in the claim must be read as
4 being performed on a computer.

5 Here we agree with the Examiner that the method claims do not mention,
6 let alone require, computer implementation. This claim is capable of being
7 performed with no more than a graph and mental thought with perhaps some
8 communication of the thoughts. Indeed, even the graph could be
9 implemented mentally. Such claims are non-statutory mental processes. *See*
10 *In re Comiskey*, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

11 In *Comiskey*, the court held that claims directed to a method for
12 mandatory arbitration resolution were unpatentable under § 101 because “the
13 patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for
14 their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor that both the
15 framers and Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject
16 matter.” *Id.* at 1378-79. Thus, the holding in *Comiskey* established that “the
17 application of human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not
18 in and of itself patentable.” *Id.* at 1379.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20 Rejecting claims 67-97 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
21 statutory subject matter is in error.

22 Rejecting claims 98-114 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
23 statutory subject matter is not in error.

1

DECISION

2 The rejection of claims 67-97 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
3 statutory subject matter is not sustained.

4 The rejection of claims 98-114 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
5 statutory subject matter is sustained.

6 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
7 appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R.
8 § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).

9

10

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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13

14 mev

15

16 Address

17 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
18 TWO EMBARCADERO CENTER
19 EIGHTH FLOOR
20 SAN FRANCISCO CA 94111-3834